inherently bilateral matter. As the Mexican and American econo grow increasingly interdependent, a restrictive U.S. policy toward Me ican immigration, without other countervailing measures, will only acerbate the present Mexican economic crisis, leading to even hig levels of Mexican unemployment.4 An intensified economic crisis c threaten Mexico's political stability, which in turn would increase incentives for Mexicans to migrate to the U.S., regardless of border p trols and incarceration centers.5 Moreover, Mexico's economic crisi has severe consequences for the United States in terms of lost tr opportunities and the stability of U.S. financial institutions.6 Bec of its economic situation, Mexico cannot afford to buy as many imports, resulting in the loss of U.S. manufacturing and export-ser jobs. Such a result is contrary to a central goal of the 1986 Immigr Reform and Control Act: protecting the U.S. job market.
Current U.S. and Mexican economic and immigration policies of counteract each other, impeding Mexican development, and thus creasing the pressure on Mexicans to migrate. This note will ana these inconsistencies in current U.S. and Mexican immigration, t trade, and investment policies. The note argues that a more effec approach to the regulation of Mexican immigration to the United Stat is for both countries to recognize their shared interests in Mexican velopment, and to coordinate their policies to achieve this end. A c dinated approach to Mexican development, especially Mexican regi development, would benefit both the U.S. and Mexican economies, allay the pressure on rural Mexicans to migrate to the United States a to Mexico's overcrowded urban areas. Part I will outline the histor social and economic background to U.S. immigration policy, and p ent the rationale for an alternative approach. Part II will analyze current U.S. and Mexican legal regimes that bear on Mexican devel ment. This section will focus on the inconsistencies between the tw nations' legal systems, and one attempt to coordinate these syste through what is known as the Maquiladora program. Part III will would foster Mexican development, especially in those regio which most Mexican immigrants migrate.
II. THE "PUSH-PULL" DEBATE AND THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL

BACKGROUND OF MEXICAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES
A. The Debate
Analysts have long debated the causes of Mexican migration. T "push-pull" theory maintains that the economic disparity betwee Mexico and the United States creates the incentive for unemployed underemployed Mexicans to migrate in search of improved econo opportunities.7 Though purportedly value-neutral, this theory h served as a basis for commentators to place responsibility for the gration and its resultant hardships on either Mexico or the Unit States, depending on the commentator's political perspective.
Those who emphasize the "push" factors for migration blame M ico for its "abject failure" to manage the nation's economic devel ment, and its unwillingness to acknowledge the nation's overpopulation.8 Restrictionists claim that corrupt and inept government officials pilfered and squandered government revenues, particularly oil revenues.9 These commentators would restrict Mexican immigration in order to compel Mexican officials to make the public policy changes necessary to eliminate the motive to migrate.10 In their view, the United States, by keeping open the safety valve of emigration through lax migration controls, merely subsidizes the corrupt practices of Mexican elites."
On the other hand, commentators who oppose strict restraints o immigration often stress certain "pull" factors. They maintain tha Mexicans have migrated to the United States not only because of t economic disparity between the two countries, but also because of a tive American recruitment of cheap Mexican labor. The anti-restri tionists charge that U.S. employers were the primary cause for th substantial increase in Mexican migration at the beginning of this ce 7. L6pez, Undocumented Mexican Migration. In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, UCLA L. REV. 615, 620 (1981).
8. See, e.g., Graham, Whom We Shall Welcome. Illegal Immigration and the New Restnrctionism, in THE PROBLEM OF THE UNDOCUMENTED WORKER, 67, 72 (R. Landmann ed. 1979). In this note, I refer to those advocates who seek to severely limit Mexican immigration as "restrictionists." An example of their position is found in P. STACY & W. LUTTON, THE IMMIGRATION TIME BOMB STANFORD LA W REVIE W tury, and that the U.S. government has either welcomed or tolerat the resulting migration during most of the last one hundred years.1
Anti-restrictionists argue that these pull factors remain. They st that immigrants contribute to the net general welfare of U.S. citizens,1 and that the aging demographic structure of the United States is lea ing to an increasing need for lower-skilled labor.'4 To remain inter tionally competitive, and to sustain modest economic growth, the U economy may require substantial immigration of lower-skilled labor In the past six years, the economic situation within Mexico h matically worsened, increasing the pressure to migrate. On Aug 1982, in part due to a dramatic fall in oil export revenues, Me nounced that "it was out of cash and could no longer make pay on its $75 billion in foreign debts."26 By the end of 1986, Mexi $101 billion in debt.27 The debt crisis is only one symptom of M economic problems. The Mexican peso's value has dropped in r to the dollar by 300-400 percent since 1982,28 and in 1987, in rose to 159 percent.29 As a result, the purchasing power of th Even without the economic crisis in Mexico, the growth of the Mexican labor force would create employment shortages. Although Mexico's population growth rate dropped to 2.7 percent by 1980 from an all-time high of 3.4 percent during the 1970s, the labor force will con tinue to grow at record rates.32 This is because of the Mexican popula 21 16, 1987, at HI, col. 1, H2, col. 3. ("In 1987 this trend continued with wages lagging about 10 percent behind inflation."); see also Eckhouse, supra note 29, at A6, col. 2 ("workers' real wages have fallen about 60 percent in the past five years").
31. Orme, supra note 30, at H2, col. 3.
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tion's youth. Almost half of Mexico's population is less than fift years old,33 and this generation will soon be demanding jobs. Mo over, the percentage of women entering the work force is increa especially in the border industries.34 Thus while the annual popula rate was falling to 2.7 percent, the labor force grew at annual rate tween 4.9 and 5.6 percent.35 In other words, just to match the i creased supply of labor, the Mexican economy must produce abo percent more jobs annually. Yet currently, the economy is creating no new jobs. In fact, t economy's annual growth rate has declined from a 7.9 percent incr in 1981 to a 3.8 percent decrease in 1986.36 Real investment in Me declined by 31 percent between 1980 and 1986.37 Mexican unemp ment stood at 4.9 million in 1985 and continues to grow.38 Labor mand projections indicate that Mexico's gross national product (G must reach a sustained growth rate of 6.6 percent by the year 200 order to employ new workers. This rate would still not alleviate underemployment problems that would affect over ten million w ers.39 With each year of stagnant economic growth, the project needs increase.
Past studies estimate that almost 80 percent of Mexican migra the United States come from rural sending communities.40 The u employment in these rural regions is responsible not only for th gration to the United States, but also for the migration to Mex increasingly overpopulated metropolitan centers. Over 80 perce all Mexican manufacturing is located in the metropolitan areas of ico City, Guadalajara, and Monterey-with "more than half of it Mexico City metropolitan area alone."41 Just as the U.S. govern wishes to deter cross-border migration, the Mexican government creasingly concerned with the migration to its metropolitan cent
The successful implementation of a rural development progr therefore in both countries' interest. 28. However, many commentators dispute the INS figures and the assertion that the U.S. ha lost control of its borders. See, e.g., A. ANDERSON, supra, at 5; J. SIMON, supra note 2. They criticize the INS' methodology, which multiplies every border apprehension by two or three to estimate the number of immigrants successfully evading capture-"even though INS ha no way to count the people it apprehends more than once," and even though the increased number of arrests obviously measure to some degree the 33 percent increase in border control enforcement in 1986. A. ANDERSON, supra, at 5. 44. 8 U.S.C. ? 1255a(a)(2)(Supp. IV 1986). 45. 8 U.S.C. ? 1324(e)(4), (f)(Supp. IV 1986). 46 . Under 8 U.S.C. ? 1160a(l)-(2)(Supp. IV 1986), special agricultural workers may apply for temporary residence status, and subsequently for permanent residence status, if they performed either 90 days of work each year between May 1, 1983 and May 1, 1986, or 90 days of work between May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986. The only difference between the two groups of workers is that the former will be eligible for lawful permanent residence sooner. In addi- 48. Some anti-restrictionists state that immigrants' expectations of work, resulting from an officially sanctioned, long-standing practice have created a moral right to be part of the communities to which they have contributed and upon which they have depended for their livelihood. See L6pez, supra note 7, at 695-702. L6pez states, "If involvement and neighbor hood matter, undocumented Mexican workers are part of the living and working community They are we." Id. at 713.
49. 8 U.S.C. ? 1255a(a)(2)(Supp. IV 1986). Congress intended to eliminate such recruitment efforts-the "pull" factors within the United States-by applying sanctions to employers continuing to employ undocumented workers.51 By hampering the "pull" factors, the United States hopes to significantly curtail Mexican immigration. The employer sanctions provision is especially important to organized labor, which fears that migrants depress wages and threaten working conditions.52 It is also important to "nativists," who contend that mass migration threatens the cultural identity of the United States.53 The provision can silence charges that the U.S. is responsible for the migration because of its failure to discourage or prosecute employers who recruit or hire undocumented workers. In this way, the United States can wash its hands of responsibility for "Mexico's problem."
On the other hand, the guest worker provisions demonstrate that the "pull" factors within the United States are still very much alive.54 These provisions authorize the recruitment of Mexican agricultural labor. Although the provisions do not apply to other industries that have traditionally employed Mexicans, such as the restaurant and hotel industries, they nonetheless reveal the continued U.S. demand for Mexican labor, and its importance to the U.S. economy.
E. An Alternative Approach
The 1986 Immigration Act will most likely fail to achieve its goal of decreased migration because of its nationalist bias. Unilaterally cutting off the "pull" factors by erecting barriers to migration will only cause unemployment to worsen in Mexico and further strain the country's ability to provide basic social services to its population.55 An aggra- The potential for increased foreign investment in Mexico is large.
Mexico currently ranks thirteenth among foreign recipients of U.S. direct investment.86 Considering Mexico's 2,000 mile border with the U.S., and the fact that Mexico consistently ranks as the United States third or fourth largest trading partner, there is much room for growth.
Investment incentives through Mexico's tax system.
Mexico's developnment program has attempted to balance investment requirements, such as local content and export requirements, with investment incentives, especially tax incentives.87 Corporation currently pay Mexican income tax at a forty-two percent rate, but under Mexico's 1987 tax reform law, the corporate tax rate will fall to thirtyfive percent by 1991.88 Although Mexico's effective corporate tax rate is higher than that under current U.S. tax law, the Mexican tax system 84. Mexico recently signed an agreement with IBM to construct a wholly microcomputer manufacturing facility in Mexico. IBM will invest $91 million in the f and in addition, will construct a semiconductor and software development center to As a general business incentive, Mexico maintains energy prices below international levels.90 The government also offers more specific incentives on the basis of new investments and increased employment. Investments in specified industries within designated national priority zones receive an investment credit.91 The country is divided into three basic zones: Least developed regions constitute zone 1, which has the highest priority; regions of "state priority" constitute zone 2; and the most developed regions, including Mexico City, constitute zone 3.92 Capital investment credits range from fifteen to twenty-five percent. An additional five percent credit applies to investments in Mexican-produced equipment.93 To encourage greater employment, the government awards credits of twenty percent of the local minimum wage per job created.94
In 1983, Mexico added an accelerated depreciation allowance to the income tax law to stimulate economic activity for those companies that have not received other incentives or subsidies.95 Assets in the first priority zone entitle the company to a fifty percent depreciation allow ance, while those in the second priority zone receive a twenty-five percent allowance.96 Businesses that sell real estate in the Federal District (Mexico City) and invest the proceeds in fixed assets in other zones als receive a credit.97
These incentives serve multiple objectives. The tax structure seeks to increase employment, to stimulate investment in priority activities, to foster balanced regional development, and to promote the formation of small industries.98 By stimulating employment in Mexico's underdeveloped regions-the regions from which most Mexicans migrate to the United States-the plan could alleviate the pressure to immigrate. However, these investment incentives only function if they are not Traditionally, Mexico has taken a highly protectionist position in international trade in order to promote its domestic industries. This strategy, known as import substitution, used tariff barriers, import-licensing requirements, and quotas, to restrict imports. Tariffs sometimes rose by as much as 100 percent, and import licensing effectively banned the importation of many products.100 During the early 1970s, the government combined import protection measures with large subsidies to domestic industries; these industries "became dependent on fiscal incentives, subsidized imports, preferential credit, and 'buy Mexico' procurement policies."''0 The result was that most Mexican products could not compete internationally. This lack of competitiveness aggravated the crisis of 1982.
After the 1982 crisis, Mexico gradually shifted its development policy toward increased export promotion.?02 A major change in Mexican trade policy occurred in August, 1986, when Mexico became a contracting party to GATT.103 To join GATT, Mexico agreed to a number of trade concessions.'04 It accepted a maximum tariff of fifty percent on all of Mexico's tariff lines.105 The government also promised to justify before GATT what remains of its import licensing system, and to eliminate the system shortly. It immediately eliminated licenses on 175 of 210 priority items. In addition, Mexico eliminated its "official price" system of tariff valuation (which raised the value for many goods for customs purposes), agreed to phase out its "buy national" policy, and promised to follow GATT codes on antidumping and subsidies. The government's rationale for loosening import restrictions is to enhance the competitiveness of Mexican industry and to reduce inflation.106
99. See notes 156-158 infra. 100. By 1982, import licensing requirements affected 80% of imports by value. Squaring Up to Big Brother, LATIN AM. WEEKLY REP., Feb. 12, 1982, at 5. Import licensing is a costly bureaucratic mechanism whereby customs must grant permission before imports can enter the domestic market. Refusal to grant a license results in complete protection. S. WEIN-TRAUB, supra note 33, at 67.
101. DEBT-SERVICING PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 18-19. By 1975, government subsidies of economic activity comprised sixty-one percent of total governmental expenditures. Id. Under a "buy Mexico" procurement policy, the government will only buy domestic goods regardless of the cost differential. Id. at 19. This assures a monopoly market for an inefficient producer. See Such changes amount to a major shift in Mexi and provide hope for a more cooperative, bilat ship with the United States.
4. The Maquiladoras.
In 1965, the Mexican government established gram, also known as the in-bond assembly pla the critical levels of unemployment that appeare of the Bracero program.107 The in-bond plants im raw materials and process them immediately f goods are not intended for sale in Mexico, an ment assesses no customs duties on them.'08 ate on either side of the border: The capital-i located in the United States, the labor-intensiv way, U.S. companies may better compete with from Asia, while Mexico obtains income to ser relieve its unemployment. Because of their g these twin companies can coordinate their oper tainable in most foreign locations of in-bond
The Mexican government has strongly prom Yet despite the problems noted by U.S. and Mexican critics, the program has employed significant numbers of Mexicans and has provided Mexico with valuable foreign exchange. Maquiladoras also have the potential to diversify the Mexican economy. Diversification is important for Mexican economic growth, stability and independence, and offers a safeguard against U.S. product-specific protectionist measures. 29 Supporters of the program argue that in the long run, the U.S. also has a strategic self-interest in contributing to Mexico's economic and polit- Although the Maquiladoras create jobs in the U.S., there is no denying that they also displace some U.S. workers. The response to these real human costs, however, should not be to curtail the program, but to fashion a cost-effective adjustment assistance program that meets these workers' needs.137
The Maquiladora program is one area in which Mexico and the 131. See Reynolds, supra note 39, at 33 (citing estimate that "from one to three jobs are created in the United States for every Mexican job in the border plants through the demand for imports from supplies and purchases by Mexican employees"); see also Tariff policy. American trade law has provided few incentives that benefit developing countries. In 1975, after years of opposition, the United States finally accepted a generalized system of tariff preferences (GSP) for imports from developing countries.139 However, protectionist groups were able to restrict GSP coverage so as to exclude many products in which developing nations were competitive.'40 More recently, in 1987, the United States removed duty-free treatment from Although neither CBI nor the Kissinger Commission report to Mexico, both reveal a tension in the United States concernin opment incentives for developing countries: a desire to prom gional trade and development, counterbalanced by political pre protect declining domestic industries.
Non-tariff barriers to Mexican imports. As with all developing co Mexico's access to the U.S. market is severely limited by non-tarif riers to imports, most notably quotas and countervailing duties government subsidies. A recent World Bank study found tha tariff barriers in leading industrialized countries impeded ap mately thirty-four percent of exports from developing countries pared to twenty-one percent among developed countries.14 1980, the U.S. has increased quantitative restrictions on deve country exports by over fifty percent.'45 U.S. quotas particular importation of Mexican steel, agricultural, and textile and products.
Quotas often appear under such euphemisms as "Voluntary Restraint Agreements"146 and "Orderly Market Agreements."'47 These agreements are designed to protect specific U.S. industries from foreign competition. Developing countries agree to them in order to avoid unilateral U.S. imposition of even more stringent import quotas or tariffs.'48 Of all Orderly Marketing Agreements, the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA), governing textile and clothing manufacture, has had the greatest impact on developing countries. Since much of textile proassistance of "at least $10 to $12 billion" on "highly concessional" terms between 1985 and 154. Yet in the case of developing countries, the Code does not prohibit export subsidies per se, but states that such subsidies should be analyzed to determine the extent to which they are consistent with the countries' "competitive and development needs." Subsidies Code, supra note 153, at art. 14(5 Trade Commission also imposed duties against Mexican low-interest loan programs and regional development incentives.160
Duties imposed against regional development incentives are particularly pernicious in the context of Mexican immigration. Migration of Mexicans originates predominantly from specific regions.'61 Development of those regions, and the resulting employment opportunities, would weaken the incentives to migrate. Mexican regional development programs thus not only serve important domestic policy goals, but also contribute to the U.S. goal of deterring illegal Mexican immigration. Moreover, regional aid policies arguably correct trade distortions rather than create them. As long as regional aid only offsets the increased infrastructure costs that an enterprise suffers because it agrees to invest in an underdeveloped region, the enterprise receives no real benefit.162 However, the legislative history of the U.S. counter- The efficiency consequences of a subsidy program can be best understood only within the context of a developing nation's overall social and economic policies. For instance, Mexico may resort to subsidies as a second-best policy to offset the disadvantage of an overvalued currency.164 Subsidies also provide such "social" benefits as employment stimulation, community stability, and the development of infant industries,165 all of which affect immigration patterns.
The U.S. also employs many government subsidy programs. Examples include special benefits to U.S. agriculture, detailed provisions of U.S. tax law which benefit specific industries, Commerce Department assistance to U.S. exporters, and the bailouts of Chrysler (1979), Penn Central (1970), and New York City through low-interest loans or insurance against default.166 Much of the nation's development has resulted from cooperation between government and business. Today in the U.S., the Southwest is attracting labor and capital investment from the Midwest.'67 Yet U.S. government support was largely responsible for the Sunbelt's development, through such projects as the nineteenth century land grant programs,168 twentieth century price controls on natural gas, subsidized power generated from federal dams, and subsidized water from government river control projects.'69 Even today, government procurement programs offer important support to the Sunbelt's electronics and aerospace industries.170 U.S. countervailing duty law is justified by a particular ideology re- The keystone in the U.S. scheme is the foreign tax credit.174 It purpose is to avoid double taxation by providing a credit for fore income taxes and foreign taxes imposed in lieu of income taxes.175 the foreign tax due on a given amount of income is equal to, or greater than, the United States tax due on that income, then the U.S. Treasu collects nothing. If the foreign tax due is less than the U.S. tax du then the U.S. Treasury deducts the foreign tax paid from the amou due under U.S. rates and collects the difference. In this way, the cre mechanism requires the U.S. taxpayer to pay the higher of the U.S. or the foreign tax, ceding to the source country the first slice of t jurisdiction.
Developing countries criticize this tax scheme because it impairs t effectiveness of tax policies that they employ to attract U.S. inve ment.176 When Mexico seeks to attract U.S. investment through l 171. See Tarullo, supra note 164, at 569-70. On the other hand, some analysts argue that the deferral provision of the U.S. tax code actually promotes more foreign investment than do the tax-sparing programs common in Europe.'80 Under the deferral provision, the government foregoes tax on certain categories of foreign corporate income until the income is distributed to U.S. shareholders, usually in the form of dividends.'18 As long as the subsidiary reinvests its profits abroad, U.S. tax law will not frustrate a developing country's tax incentives. In this way, and in contrast to tax-sparing agreements, the U.S. system encourages reinvestment of profits rather than rapid remittance. This encouragement has bred strong political opposition to the provision within the U.S., particularly from labor, on the grounds that it reduces domestic investment and employment by subsidizing "runaway plants."'82
Objectives of current U.S approach: A critique. The underlying ideals of current U.S. tax law are tax neutrality and tax equity. note 183, at 1409. One ground for opposition to the deferral provision is that it allege violates the principle of tax neutrality, and thereby distorts investment decisions. See Fran Freeman, supra note 182, at 6-7; Pugh, supra note 182, at 278-79. On the other hand, supp ers of deferral argue that it is tax neutral if one focuses on the import of capital to developin countries rather than on the export of capital from them. With respect to unremitted profit if there were no deferral provision, U.S. companies would not "compete on an equal basis" with companies from other nationalities. Pugh, supra note 182, at 278-79.
186. See Hellawell, supra note 183, at 1410-11. 187. See Pugh, supra note 182, at 296. Moreover, the U.S. tax system presently off some incentives, such as the asset depreciation range for rapid depreciation, only to dome investments, thereby discriminating against investment in developing countries in favor domestic investment. Prior to the passage of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the investment t credit was likewise inapplicable to foreign-earned income. Id. at 278.
188 This time almost 300,000 jobs were lost to the U.S. economy.193 Mexico's depressed economy results in reduced employment o portunities in both countries. The Mexican economy is short of capital necessary to promote domestic investment, and therefore benefit significantly from increased U.S. investment. The precise eff of a tax-sparing mechanism favoring investment in Mexico is unc Yet it appears that, as in the case of the Maquiladoras, jobs lost to eign investment could be more than offset by jobs created throug creased trade with a rejuvenated Mexican economy.'94 Thus appears that a tax-sparing mechanism's primary effect would be to sh U.S. employment from more labor-intensive, import-competing jo higher-productivity, export-oriented ones.'95
The final question that supporters of preferential tax measures mu answer is whether they efficiently achieve their goal of promoting d opment or whether, instead, they constitute expensive windfalls t vestors who would invest in developing countries anyway for non reasons. There is evidence that many developing countries' past 202. See M. RAO, supra note 183, at 16 (stressing importance of placing limits on eligibility); Hellawell, supra note 183, at 1424 (stressing the need for selectivity to reduce windfall benefits).
November 1988] from investors and compliance with specific operating requirements.2
For a corporation to qualify as a possessions corporation, substant all of the corporation's income over a three-year period preceding tion "must be derived from sources within a possession,"204 and m of its income during such period must "be derived from the active co duct of a trade or business" within a possession.205 Were such an proach extended to Mexico, a mechanism could be negotiate specify qualified investment targets in order to tailor concession Mexico's specific development needs.
One approach to tax concessions argues that they are form privatized foreign aid.206 Although the U.S. foreign aid program been cut recently, the program was curtailed less for its objectives th for its deemed wastefulness. The Reagan administration has argu that foreign aid must be privatized to avoid misallocation or emb ment by corrupt bureaucrats and their supervisors.207 This ratio counters the argument that direct subsidies to foreign governments a economically more efficient than tax incentives.208 Tax incentives go companies that meet specified criteria, not to public projects throu bureaucratic intermediary. Given the current U.S. deficit and the political attitude in Wash ton toward foreign aid, Congress is unlikely to enact tax incenti measures for investment in Mexico unless they appeal to U.S. as we to Mexican interests. A properly tailored tax incentive mechanis needs to rely on the justifications of the Maquiladora program: th benefiting the Mexican economy, such a policy increases the purchasin power of Mexicans to buy U.S. products, and generates export-pro ing and import-servicing jobs in the U.S.; that such a program prov valuable capital for Mexico so it can both service its debt to U.S. fi cial institutions and meet its public's basic needs so as to alleviate pressure to migrate to the U.S.; and that such a policy helps main the economic, political, and social stability of a country that shar 
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[Vol. 41:187 tax exemptions to investments in developing countries, the ultimate form of relief.210 Canada, Switzerland and the Netherlands do not tax dividends from foreign subsidiaries under specified conditions.21' The German system prolongs deferral of taxation for labor-intensive foreign investments.212 Japan and the United Kingdom have signed taxsparing treaties with certain developing nations.213 The United States actually signed treaties that provided a seven percent investment credit with Brazil, Israel, and Thailand in the 1960s, but Congress never ratified the treaties.214
One disadvantage of the tax-sparing methods listed above compared to deferral is that these methods do not discriminate between deferred and repatriated income, so that in some instances they may promote repatriation of income rather than reinvestment in the developing country.215 On the other hand, such approaches may create greater amounts of initial investment. These approaches can then be supplemented by host country programs encouraging reinvestment. Brazil, for instance, in order to develop its Northeast region, allows Developing countries employ numerous forms of tax incentives to attract investment. The most common form is the tax holiday.217 Generally, a tax holiday grants complete income tax exemption for a period of about five years. A variation of this approach is a partial exemption, in which a holiday is limited to a specified percentage of investment. Tax holidays are not biased against labor-intensive industries, since they are tied not to capital inputs, but to profits.218 However, they are also rather expensive in terms of foregone tax revenue.
Developing countries also use allowances and tax credits as techniques to attract investment. Under these approaches, investors can respectively deduct or credit a percentage of new investment against taxable income. The disadvantage of these techniques, especially in the 210. M. RAO, supra note 183, at 11. context of lessening migration pressures, is that they invariab mote capital-intensive investments at the expense of labor-in ones.219 Unlike tax holidays, the credited amount is tied to ca puts, not profits. Investment grants carry the logic behind allowa step further, by making outright payments to qualified firms are typically paid as construction is completed, so they are not gent on an enterprise's success. These grants, though highly at to foreign investors, are applied less often than other incentive nisms because they are so speculative; the developing country, The expression of such fears could signify a shift in U.S. policy fr an almost religious defense of a simplified version of "free trade" search for appropriate forms of government intervention in the e omy to stimulate U.S. competitiveness and manage the country's e nomic destiny. The major competitors of the United States al variants of deliberate business-government collaboration to a gre extent.234 The success of theJapanese economy in particular has c lenged U.S. policy. Now that the U.S. economy is losing its predo nant status in the world, and U.S. business and labor interests are demanding government intervention to offset the onslaught of imports and the loss of foreign markets, U.S. economic policymakers are beginning to realize that government efforts to manage markets might be enduring features of an interdependent world economic system, not irritating anomalies.235
United States trade "policy" has often entailed more ad hoc adjustment to foreign competition than rationally devised programs.236 The U.S. government has subsidized U.S. industry through inadvertence rather than planning through such measures as trade quotas in response to complaints of foreign dumping, emergency bailouts, commercial spinoffs from military research and development programs such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (alias "Star Wars").237 Political candidates have now begun to call for increased government expenditures on education (an implicit subsidy), on worker retraining, and on 230. Heilbroner, supra note 227, at 105. 231. Id. at 97 (radical change has occurred in international economic relations now that advanced equipment can be installed in a country with cheap labor). Since 1913, the dominant capitalist economies' share of world industrial production has dropped from over 90% to just over 50%. Id. at 100.
232. An example of the argument of the dependencia school, stressing the need for Latin America to protect its economic autonomy, is found in Raul Prebisch's work. See, e.g., November 1988] Two decades ago, Mexico never would have agreed to a dev ment policy with a central focus on rural employment. The gov ment would have regarded such a proposal as an imperialist thr Mexico's future, sacrificing capital-intensive, urban manufacturin the benefit of U.S. migration concerns.242 Today, given the failu Mexico's capital-biased, import substitution program, the size of can unemployment, and the overcrowding and pollution of Mex urban centers, Mexican officials recognize the pressing need to c employment, especially in rural areas.243 Reducing protection of tal-intensive manufacturers relative to labor-intensive sectors, su agriculture, could lead to significant increases in employment.244 a policy change could stimulate the export of processed foods and crops such as cotton, fruits, tomatoes, and other winter vegetable 243. This recognition is reflected in Mexico's rural development programs. See notes 91-94 supra and accompanying text; see also note 222 supra and accompanying text.
244. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 31 (study indicates that reduction of "relative protection of less labor-intensive manufacturers" could create over 500,000 additional jobs in the rural sector by 1990). There is a more direct approach to restrain migration from Mexico to the United States than liberalizing capital flows. The two governments could stimulate investment in the rural sending communities through a binational tax and investment policy. This is an area in which the United States and Mexico can better coordinate their legal systems. Mexico currently offers tax credits to investors in underdeveloped regions.279 However, foreign companies are hesitant to invest in Mexico because of a lack of infrastructure, which entails higher costs for the firm. This problem is exacerbated by the U.S. tax system's neutralization of Mexico's tax incentive scheme. Although the deferral provision of the U.S tax code encourages companies to reinvest their earnings, it does not stimulate initial investment in these regions. In order to assist Mexico in attracting employment-producing investments, the United States should strongly consider extending the principle behind the possessions tax credit280 to qualified regional investments. Under this approach, the United States would recognize certain designated Mexican tax incentives which it would neither countervail nor tax through the operation of the foreign tax credit. This approach would provide U.S. firms with additional incentives to channel investments into Mexico's underdeveloped regions.
The feasibility of this approach depends on the level of national pr ority that the U.S. places on Mexican rural development and the re ing decrease in Mexican immigration.281 The degree of priority, turn, would determine the amount of tax dollars the U.S. would be wi ing to forego. At a time when the U.S. deficit is of increasing nat concern, a development policy which reduces the amount of tax r nues may be politically infeasible. However, despite the budget def the U.S. does offer such tax treatment to Puerto Rico, and, in 198 extended this treatment to Caribbean Basin Initiative beneficiaries under specified conditions.282 Providing tax incentives would be more efficient than giving direct grants in foreign aid. Funds would go directly toward investment, and not pass through a bureaucratic intermediary. Eliminating the intermediary would reduce transaction costs and would abate fears that the funds were being embezzled by corrupt officials.
A coordinated agreement could be based on the paradigm of the ? 936 possession tax credit. Alternatively, negotiators could use an approach that would exempt specific percentages of taxable income of qualifying investments.283 These mechanisms would be combined with a modification of the Mexican tax system. To attract more labor-intensive investments, Mexico would replace its investment tax credits with partial income tax exemptions for qualified investments in economically depressed regions.284 This change would not only further Mexican employment objectives. It would also be more compatible with the United States' goal of sustaining the manufacturing base to its economy.
In general terms, the program's incentives must be sufficiently selective to minimize windfalls, yet sufficiently large to attract significant employment-generating investment.285 The Mexican National Commission of Foreign Investment would determine qualifying investments based on specific criteria to meet specific regional needs.286 The amount of tax exclusion should reflect the amount of employment generation and the type and size of the investment, and should not be biased against labor-intensive investments.
The advantages of a bilateral approach over a unilateral change in U.S. tax and trade laws are multifold. First, the program can be tai- As part of a package, Mexico could agree to loosen its barriers to U.S. investment in specific regions, and to participate in mandatory arbitration of investment disputes with companies in those regions.287 In return, the U.S. could agree to amend its anti-subsidy law's prohibition against regional development incentives,288 and agree to limit its taxation of qualifying regional investments through a tax-sparing approach.
In addition, the two countries could negotiate for increased access to each other's markets in specific sectors, such as agriculture and processed foods.289
Since policies affecting migration, debt, investment, and trade interact with each other, the development of a binational investment-tax agreement is neither sufficient nor required to restrain migration from
Mexico. The precondition for effectively addressing such migration is not the passage of another law, but the recognition by both the U.S. and Mexico that migration, trade, and investment policies affect one another, that the United States and Mexico have important mutual economic interests, and that these interests can be most effectively pursued not through unilateral action, but through bilateral negotiation. Once the two countries recognize that coordination toward fuller exchange of trade and capital flows serves the interests of both nations, appropriate policies can be adopted. The proposed binational agreement is merely one means to achieve policy coordination.
5. Adjustment assistance: aid to displaced workers.
Shifting labor and capital resources into more productive activities is a key to economic growth.290 If a nation rigidly protects existing industries, the economy can experience sclerosis, "a hardening of the economic arteries."291 A decline in economic growth would result in decreases in productivity, net employment, and national wealth. However, this churning of productive resources also results in worker displacement and industrial dislocation. Although net jobs are created and society as a whole benefits, workers and investors in specific sectors The process of adjustment must be considered as part of a bilat approach. If the maquiladora program expands and if the U.S. rem trade barriers to Mexican imports, many labor-intensive sectors in U.S. economy would have to contract. In the absence of income s port and training assistance for displaced workers and their fami some U.S. workers would endure severe costs. Rather than tryin freeze its inefficient industries in the status quo through trade barri the U.S. government should direct its assistance to those who suffer t direct shocks of trade displacement.292
There are three primary rationales for an adjustment program: uity, efficiency, and political efficacy.293 First, for equitable reasons ciety should part with a portion of its net gains from the reductio protectionist barriers to compensate workers displaced by those p cies. Second, depending on its cost-efficiency, an adjustment policy also be more efficient than a pure free trade policy. By subsidizing retraining and relocation of displaced workers, government can fa tate the redeployment of labor resources into more productive ac ties. Third, if the U.S. provides an effective workers' adjustm program, the proposed measures to enhance trade and investment tween Mexico and the U.S. become more politically feasible. Sincej lost from liberalized trade policies are often more visible to the gener public than those gained, Congress is more likely to support a bila agreement if displaced workers receive assistance. This has been in the past. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, adjustment assi ance programs were instrumental in Congress' passage of liberali trade agreements.294 Current U.S. law provides adjustment assistance through two me anisms: the so-called escape clause and a trade adjustment assistan program. The escape clause is targeted to assist firms. It allows d mestic industries to receive temporary protection from imports t threaten them with serious economic injury.295 The trade adjustm assistance program provides aid to displaced workers, as well a trade-impacted firms and communities.296 292. Under Balassa's theory, U.S. policy logically should aim at "promoting the m ment of resources from lower to higher productivity activities" so that existing protecti such major sectors as textiles, steel, and footwear can be dismantled. Balassa, supra note When it provides protection, the escape clause can be exc costly to consumers, especially when quotas are imposed inste iffs.297 Although the President has the discretion to deny relief tection would impair U.S. economic and foreign policy i 301. Although the program needs to be expanded, it also needs to be tailored to adequate incentives for workers to find new jobs. Lawrence and Litan propose a syste should meet these criteria. Benefits would be provided to compensate workers "on they accept new employment" unless they reside "in regions of high unemploymen alternative jobs may be less plentiful." Id. at 112. Benefits would partially offset the age loss in salary that tenured workers suffer when they are forced to seek new emp The amount of the offset would increase with the age and experience of the worke funds would supplement unemployment insurance payments. Id.
302. For citation of numerous other studies, see id. at 69-70; see also notes 272-2 and accompanying text. United States unilaterally attempted to cut back the flow of Mexi labor to the United States. This law will prove ineffective becaus does not recognize two prerequisites for an effective policy. First, migration policy must be coordinated with trade, investment, debt, a tax policy so that these policies do not counteract each other. Seco these policies must be bilaterally coordinated in order to foster M can economic development. Otherwise, a distressed Mexican econ situation will continue to frustrate achievement of the goals behind a stract laws.
In a world of interdependent labor and capital migration flows, Mexico and the United States can no longer insulate themselves from each other. Mexico cannot shut itself off from U.S. trade and investment if it wishes to grow economically, to provide employment for its people, and to raise their standard of living. Similarly, the United States must recognize that Mexican development does not represent a further threat to a U.S. economy already under siege from imports. Instead, such development bears the potential for access to a larger Mexican consumer and industrial market, and for a coordination of resources that can enhance the international competitiveness of truly "American" products. Only then will Mexican migration, both to the United States and to Mexico's overcrowded industrial centers, diminish. Mexican regional development is in the interests of both countries.
